Impact
Affected versions of Winter CMS allow a backend AJAX handler to be invoked by a plain top-level GET navigation with no CSRF token. Backend\Classes\Controller::actionExists() accepted any public method on a controller as a page action, so handler-shaped names were never reserved from URL dispatch: an authenticated and authorized request to /backend/system/eventlogs/index_onEmptyLog reached the handler of the same name and truncated the system event log. Backend paths are routed through Route::any, and CSRF validation is skipped for HEAD, GET and OPTIONS requests.
The default SameSite=Lax session cookie is sent on top-level cross-site navigation, so a link on an attacker-controlled page is sufficient — no form, no script and no token. Handler arguments are taken from URL path segments, so the attacker also chooses the target record. Affected handlers across the backend, cms and system modules cover log truncation, resetting settings to their defaults, altering backend user state, and deleting CMS templates. None of them disclose data to the attacker or write attacker-controlled content, so the impact is destructive and state-changing rather than confidential.
To actively exploit this issue, an attacker would need no account of their own, but would need an authenticated backend user holding the relevant permission to follow an attacker-supplied link. The permissions guarding the affected handlers, system.access_logs included, are by default assigned only to the built-in Developer role.
Patches
Page-action dispatch is now restricted to all-lowercase method names, which reserves handler-shaped names (onFoo, index_onFoo) from being reached by URL. AJAX dispatch is unchanged: handlers continue to work over POST with the X-WINTER-REQUEST-HANDLER header exactly as before, and need no changes.
IMPORTANT: This fix includes a breaking change to backend action routing. A public controller method used as a page action must now be named in lowercase — coming_soon() rather than comingSoon() — and dashed URLs are normalised to snake_case, so /coming-soon now resolves to coming_soon() instead of comingSoon(). Plugins with a camelCase page action should rename the method and its view file to match; the published URL does not need to change. Core is unaffected, and a survey of the plugin ecosystem found the change affects only a small number of plugins.
This security issue has been fixed in v1.2.14.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, apply 353b238 manually.
As an interim mitigation, set 'same_site' => 'strict' in config/session.php. A strict session cookie is not sent on cross-site top-level navigation, which prevents the victim's session accompanying an attacker's link. Review this against any single sign-on or inbound-link flows into your backend first, as it also affects legitimate cross-site entry.
References
Credit to Awwader (@NRAwwad) for reporting the issue.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Impact
Affected versions of Winter CMS allow a backend AJAX handler to be invoked by a plain top-level
GETnavigation with no CSRF token.Backend\Classes\Controller::actionExists()accepted any public method on a controller as a page action, so handler-shaped names were never reserved from URL dispatch: an authenticated and authorized request to/backend/system/eventlogs/index_onEmptyLogreached the handler of the same name and truncated the system event log. Backend paths are routed throughRoute::any, and CSRF validation is skipped forHEAD,GETandOPTIONSrequests.The default
SameSite=Laxsession cookie is sent on top-level cross-site navigation, so a link on an attacker-controlled page is sufficient — no form, no script and no token. Handler arguments are taken from URL path segments, so the attacker also chooses the target record. Affected handlers across thebackend,cmsandsystemmodules cover log truncation, resetting settings to their defaults, altering backend user state, and deleting CMS templates. None of them disclose data to the attacker or write attacker-controlled content, so the impact is destructive and state-changing rather than confidential.To actively exploit this issue, an attacker would need no account of their own, but would need an authenticated backend user holding the relevant permission to follow an attacker-supplied link. The permissions guarding the affected handlers,
system.access_logsincluded, are by default assigned only to the built-in Developer role.Patches
Page-action dispatch is now restricted to all-lowercase method names, which reserves handler-shaped names (
onFoo,index_onFoo) from being reached by URL. AJAX dispatch is unchanged: handlers continue to work overPOSTwith theX-WINTER-REQUEST-HANDLERheader exactly as before, and need no changes.This security issue has been fixed in v1.2.14.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, apply 353b238 manually.
As an interim mitigation, set
'same_site' => 'strict'inconfig/session.php. A strict session cookie is not sent on cross-site top-level navigation, which prevents the victim's session accompanying an attacker's link. Review this against any single sign-on or inbound-link flows into your backend first, as it also affects legitimate cross-site entry.References
Credit to Awwader (@NRAwwad) for reporting the issue.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: