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langgraph-api: Incomplete assistant authorization in LangGraph Server run creation

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 11, 2026 in langchain-ai/helm • Updated Aug 19, 2026

Package

pip langgraph-api (pip)

Affected versions

< 0.10.0

Patched versions

0.10.0

Description

Summary

In affected versions of langgraph-api (the LangGraph Server runtime), the run-creation path authorized the assistant attached to a run using a different authorization event than the rest of the assistant-handling code paths. Direct assistant reads and cron creation dispatch the assistants.read authorization event; run creation dispatched assistants.search with an incomplete value. In deployments whose custom authorization handlers register only an assistants.read handler (without an assistants.search handler and without a global fallback handler), no handler was consulted on the run-creation path, the returned filter set was empty, and the owner constraint was omitted from the resulting query.

As a result, in those deployments a request to create a run could reference a private assistant owned by another user, even where direct assistant reads, assistant search, and cron creation against that assistant were correctly denied. The run-creation response merged the referenced assistant's metadata, config, and context into fields returned to the requesting user. These fields can carry sensitive configuration; the runtime encrypts them at rest for that reason.

We have no evidence of this behavior occurring in the wild.

Affected users / systems

You may be affected if you:

  • run langgraph-api (the LangGraph Server / Agent Server runtime, including via the LangGraph Platform Helm chart), and
  • use custom authorization handlers that gate assistant access through an assistants.read or assistants.search handler rather than a global handler covering all assistant events.

Deployments without custom authorization handlers, or whose handlers apply an equivalent owner filter across all assistant events (for example through a global handler), are not affected.

Impact

  • Confidentiality: exposure of another user's private assistant metadata, config, and context through the run-creation response. These fields can contain sensitive configuration.
  • Integrity: creation of a run associated with another user's private assistant, beyond the requesting user's authorization scope; the run is then carried out using that assistant's configuration.

Patches / mitigation

Run creation, and the parallel cron-creation path, now dispatch the assistants.read authorization event in both the in-memory and gRPC/Postgres runtimes, matching direct assistant reads. Client-supplied run and cron metadata is no longer forwarded into that authorization event, so handlers receive a consistent value shape and determine access by returning an owner filter that is applied server-side. Fixed in langgraph-api 0.10.0.

This is a behavioral change for deployments with custom authorization handlers:

  • Handlers that gated assistant access only through assistants.search during run creation are no longer consulted on that path; provide an equivalent assistants.read handler that returns the same owner filter.
  • The metadata field on the assistants.read event during run and cron creation is no longer populated; handlers that read or stamped it should move that logic into the run/cron create handlers.

Operational guidance

  • Register an assistants.read handler (or a global handler covering it) that returns an owner-style filter, and confirm parity across the assistant read, search, and run/cron creation paths.
  • Upgrade to a release containing this change.

References

@nick-hollon-lc nick-hollon-lc published to langchain-ai/helm Jun 11, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Aug 19, 2026
Reviewed Aug 19, 2026
Last updated Aug 19, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Improper Authorization

The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-55236

GHSA ID

GHSA-jfj5-wrj9-63x4

Source code

Credits

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