Impact
A path validation issue in go-git could allow crafted repository data to affect files outside the intended checkout target, including the repository's .git directory.
These validations were introduced in upstream Git years ago, so the vulnerability arose from go-git drifting from those checks. Some attack vectors were platform-specific: certain payloads affected only Windows users, others affected only macOS users, and some applied across all supported platforms.
Using non-descendant go-billy filesystem instances, or different filesystem types, for the Storer and Worktree may provide some isolation against .git directory manipulation. For example, users that store the .git directory through memfs while using osfs for the worktree are not affected by this vulnerability in the main repository, because repository metadata is not materialized inside the worktree filesystem.
However, this isolation does not necessarily apply when the repository contains submodules, since submodule dotgit directories may still be represented or materialized within the worktree context.
It is important to note that exploitation requires a maliciously crafted repository payload. Users should always exercise caution when interacting with repositories or Git servers they do not trust.
Patches
Users should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to v5 are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported go-git version.
Credits
Thanks to @kodareef5, @AyushParkara and @N0zoM1z0 for reporting this to the go-git project in three separate reports. 🙇
References
AyushParkara Reporter
N0zoM1z0 Reporter
Impact
A path validation issue in
go-gitcould allow crafted repository data to affect files outside the intended checkout target, including the repository's.gitdirectory.These validations were introduced in upstream Git years ago, so the vulnerability arose from go-git drifting from those checks. Some attack vectors were platform-specific: certain payloads affected only Windows users, others affected only macOS users, and some applied across all supported platforms.
Using non-descendant
go-billyfilesystem instances, or different filesystem types, for theStorerandWorktreemay provide some isolation against.gitdirectory manipulation. For example, users that store the.gitdirectory throughmemfswhile usingosfsfor the worktree are not affected by this vulnerability in the main repository, because repository metadata is not materialized inside the worktree filesystem.However, this isolation does not necessarily apply when the repository contains submodules, since submodule dotgit directories may still be represented or materialized within the worktree context.
It is important to note that exploitation requires a maliciously crafted repository payload. Users should always exercise caution when interacting with repositories or Git servers they do not trust.
Patches
Users should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to
v5are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported go-git version.Credits
Thanks to @kodareef5, @AyushParkara and @N0zoM1z0 for reporting this to the go-git project in three separate reports. 🙇
References