OAuth2 Proxy has an Authorization Bypass in Email Domain Validation via Malformed Multi-@ Email Claims
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Apr 14, 2026
in
oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy
•
Updated Apr 27, 2026
Package
Affected versions
< 7.15.2
Patched versions
7.15.2
Description
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Apr 15, 2026
Reviewed
Apr 15, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Apr 21, 2026
Last updated
Apr 27, 2026
Impact
An authorization bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy as part of the
email_domainenforcement option. An attacker may be able to authenticate with an email claim such asattacker@evil.com@company.comand satisfy an allowed domain check forcompany.com, even though the claim is not a valid email address.The issue ONLY affects deployments that rely on
email_domainrestrictions and accept email claim values from identity providers or claim mappings that do not strictly enforce normal email syntax. The practical risk ONLY exists in self-hosted or custom OIDC environments and federated setups where unexpected claim values can reach oauth2-proxy. Standard hosted providers that enforce valid email formatting ARE NOT effected.Patches
Users should upgrade to
v7.15.2or later once available.Workarounds
The most effective workaround is to ensure the configured identity provider cannot emit malformed or attacker-controlled email claim values.
References