Impact
The backend FileUpload form widget trusted an attacker-controlled file_id POST parameter when resolving the attachment it operates on. The lookup (FileUpload::getFileRecord()) resolved the posted id against the global system_files table without verifying that the file belonged to the widget's own relation, parent record, or deferred-binding session.
Any authenticated backend user who can reach a form containing a fileupload field — including the built-in My Account avatar field, which requires no specific backend permission — could therefore target a System\Models\File record belonging to another user or record and:
- modify its
title and description via onSaveAttachmentConfig, and
- change its
sort_order via onSortAttachments (which passed posted ids
straight to setSortableOrder(), an unscoped UPDATE ... WHERE id = ?).
The same unscoped lookup is reached by onLoadAttachmentConfig, onSaveAttachmentConfig, and onRemoveAttachment. Because all attachments share the single System\Models\File model and system_files table, an attacker was not limited to other users' avatars — any attachment on any model could be referenced by id. Attachment ids are sequential integers and are easily enumerated.
The confirmed impact is unauthorized integrity modification of arbitrary attachment metadata and ordering.
CSRF tokens are still verified on all POST requests, so an attacker must be authenticated to the backend with a valid session. To exploit this issue an attacker needs a backend account with any level of access.
Patches
The FileUpload widget now scopes every file_id lookup to the widget's own relation, including any files bound through the current deferred-binding session, so a posted id can no longer reference an unrelated System\Models\File record:
getFileRecord() resolves the id through getRelationObject()->withDeferred($this->sessionKey)->find(...) rather than the global file model. This covers onLoadAttachmentConfig, onSaveAttachmentConfig, and onRemoveAttachment.
onSortAttachments() intersects the posted ids with the ids that actually belong to the relation before calling setSortableOrder().
This security issue has been fixed as of v1.2.13 (commit 9cb0ae5f9d837db141ab111c6a7de8eed9603d25).
Workarounds
There is no supported workaround other than upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, you may apply the fix manually in modules/backend/formwidgets/FileUpload.php:
- In
getFileRecord(), replace $this->getRelationModel()->find(post('file_id')) with $this->getRelationObject()->withDeferred($this->sessionKey)->find(post('file_id')).
- In
onSortAttachments(), filter the posted sortOrder ids to those returned by $this->getRelationObject()->withDeferred($this->sessionKey)->pluck($keyName) before calling setSortableOrder().
References
Impact
The backend
FileUploadform widget trusted an attacker-controlledfile_idPOST parameter when resolving the attachment it operates on. The lookup (FileUpload::getFileRecord()) resolved the posted id against the globalsystem_filestable without verifying that the file belonged to the widget's own relation, parent record, or deferred-binding session.Any authenticated backend user who can reach a form containing a
fileuploadfield — including the built-in My Account avatar field, which requires no specific backend permission — could therefore target aSystem\Models\Filerecord belonging to another user or record and:titleanddescriptionviaonSaveAttachmentConfig, andsort_orderviaonSortAttachments(which passed posted idsstraight to
setSortableOrder(), an unscopedUPDATE ... WHERE id = ?).The same unscoped lookup is reached by
onLoadAttachmentConfig,onSaveAttachmentConfig, andonRemoveAttachment. Because all attachments share the singleSystem\Models\Filemodel andsystem_filestable, an attacker was not limited to other users' avatars — any attachment on any model could be referenced by id. Attachment ids are sequential integers and are easily enumerated.The confirmed impact is unauthorized integrity modification of arbitrary attachment metadata and ordering.
CSRF tokens are still verified on all POST requests, so an attacker must be authenticated to the backend with a valid session. To exploit this issue an attacker needs a backend account with any level of access.
Patches
The
FileUploadwidget now scopes everyfile_idlookup to the widget's own relation, including any files bound through the current deferred-binding session, so a posted id can no longer reference an unrelatedSystem\Models\Filerecord:getFileRecord()resolves the id throughgetRelationObject()->withDeferred($this->sessionKey)->find(...)rather than the global file model. This coversonLoadAttachmentConfig,onSaveAttachmentConfig, andonRemoveAttachment.onSortAttachments()intersects the posted ids with the ids that actually belong to the relation before callingsetSortableOrder().This security issue has been fixed as of v1.2.13 (commit
9cb0ae5f9d837db141ab111c6a7de8eed9603d25).Workarounds
There is no supported workaround other than upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, you may apply the fix manually in
modules/backend/formwidgets/FileUpload.php:getFileRecord(), replace$this->getRelationModel()->find(post('file_id'))with$this->getRelationObject()->withDeferred($this->sessionKey)->find(post('file_id')).onSortAttachments(), filter the postedsortOrderids to those returned by$this->getRelationObject()->withDeferred($this->sessionKey)->pluck($keyName)before callingsetSortableOrder().References