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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds explicit remote execution restrictions to rendered agent guidance and denies ChangesRemote execution boundary
Priority: ⬆️ High Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Severity of issue fixed: High Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The new remote-execution restrictions remain bypassable when wrapper commands invoke absolute-path SSH-family executables, potentially allowing unauthorized use of authenticated remote sessions. Matcher and idempotence coverage should also be completed before merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1🛠️ Fix failing CI checks 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Inline comments:
In `@internal/components/permissions/inject.go`:
- Around line 58-65: Update the permission deny rules in both listed ranges of
internal/components/permissions/inject.go to cover absolute-path and wrapper
invocations of ssh, scp, sftp, and rsync at the execution boundary, while
retaining the existing bare-command rules. Add integration coverage for invoking
absolute-path ssh through an existing SSH ControlMaster socket and verify it is
denied.
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e2e/organicruntime/organic_runtime_test.gointernal/components/agentguidance/routing.gointernal/components/agentguidance/routing_test.gointernal/components/permissions/inject.gointernal/components/permissions/inject_test.go
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Documenting the residual risk I verified while testing this, so it is explicit for review, plus an offer of follow-up work. What the deny rules provably cover (verified against OpenCode's permission source:
What command-name denies cannot cover (inherent to any denylist of commands):
For those, the compensating control in this PR is the always-on "Remote execution boundary" routing directive (no remote execution or ambient-socket discovery without explicit user direction), which also covers agents with no permission profile at all (Cursor, Codex, Gemini, and friends). The structural fix for points 1 and 2 lives at the sandbox/OS level or in the agent runtimes upstream, not in generated settings files. Happy to do a small follow-up if maintainers want it (for example absolute-path deny variants for the canonical bin dirs, or extending the list to |
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Inline comments:
In `@internal/components/permissions/inject.go`:
- Around line 77-78: Update the permission rules near the existing Bash SSH
entries to deny option-bearing command and exec wrappers for ssh, scp, sftp, and
rsync. Add Claude Code Bash(command:*) and Bash(exec:*) protections and the
corresponding OpenCode "command *" and "exec *" deny rules, preserving
direct-command permissions.
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Rebased onto current main. The rebase surfaced a real decision this PR now forces, so I'd like a maintainer call before it goes further. While this branch was open, #4327 and #4344 landed an ask-by-default policy for the remote shell utilities, and This PR keeps deny-by-default for |
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Inline comments:
In `@internal/components/permissions/inject.go`:
- Line 136: Update the permission matching around the SSH deny rule to enforce
remote-execution policy after command parsing, so wrapper forms such as env,
command, and exec -a cannot bypass it and fall through to the wildcard allow.
Use resolved-executable matching or a default-deny boundary for remote-capable
commands, and add runtime coverage for these wrapper forms.
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…ote shell utilities (Gentleman-Programming#4324) Close the remaining resolution bypasses flagged by the Gentleman-Programming#4330 review: env(1) execs the utility after optional flags and NAME=VALUE assignments, and exec -a renames argv[0] before executing it, so both fell through the wildcard allow as single parsed command nodes. Both overlays now enumerate, per tool: the env exact/prefix forms (env X, env X:*) and the internal-glob forms (env * X *, exec -a * X *) covering env -i X and env NAME=VALUE X. Verified against OpenCode wildcard.ts (every * compiles to .*) and Claude Code glob docs (internal wildcards supported; bare forms kept separate per #26229). The boundary fixtures flip with the policy: env/-i/assignment and exec -a invocations are denied matcher inputs, while &&-chains and interpreter programs remain out of scope. Glob entries are deliberately conservative: benign commands like env LC_ALL=C sort ssh_keys.txt also match and are denied — the safe side of a remote-execution boundary.
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Requesting two maintainer-applied labels on this one: The PR sits at 450 changed lines (+435/−15), 50 over the cognitive budget. The overage is the last commit (345944d), which closes CodeRabbit's actionable finding on For review confidence: the added commit already passed the native four-lens review (risk, resilience, readability, reliability) with zero blocking findings, and CodeRabbit's re-review of the new head is green on the code itself. If the size still feels wrong to you, happy to defer the wrapper commit into a follow-up PR after this merges instead. |
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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@internal/components/permissions/inject_test.go`:
- Around line 841-842: Add matcher-based assertions to
TestInjectClaudeCodeDeniesRemoteShellUtilities for the wrapper deny patterns
covering env -i ssh, env FOO=1 ssh, and exec -a alias ssh, while retaining the
existing serialized deny-list membership checks.
In `@internal/components/permissions/inject.go`:
- Around line 90-91: Add deny rules in both overlays for absolute-path ssh, scp,
sftp, and rsync invocations wrapped by env or exec -a, covering each
wrapper/path combination; alternatively enforce the deny after executable
resolution. Extend the relevant permission tests to verify every wrapper and
executable path combination.
- Around line 88-91: Add a regression test for calling Inject twice with
claudeAdapter(): assert the second result reports Changed == false and verify
each deny rule appears only once, preserving idempotent Claude permissions
injection.
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…lities (Gentleman-Programming#4324) CodeRabbit follow-up on Gentleman-Programming#4330: - add env/exec -a wrapper rules over every absolute install prefix for ssh/scp/sftp/rsync in both the Claude Code and OpenCode overlays - matcher-based assertions for env -i / env FOO=1 / exec -a wrapper invocations in bare-name and absolute-path forms, with negative controls - regression test: Inject with claudeAdapter() is idempotent (second call reports Changed == false, each deny rule appears exactly once)
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Withdrawing the I force-pushed this branch back to the first three commits: 376 changed lines now (exact/wildcard/escaped/absolute-path deny forms + routing guidance + aligned #4327 fixtures), then merged current On issue linkage: this slice closes the reported attack path (the repro is a plain Two things unchanged:
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… sockets (Gentleman-Programming#4324) Agents with unrestricted bash could discover ambient SSH ControlMaster sockets (ps aux, /tmp) and run commands on remote infrastructure through the user's authenticated sessions, with no permission boundary firing. - Claude Code overlay: deny Bash(ssh|scp|sftp|rsync) in exact and :* prefix forms. - OpenCode/Kilocode overlay: deny ssh/scp/sftp/rsync in exact and wildcard forms alongside the existing bash rules. - Routing guidance: always-on "Remote execution boundary" section for every configured agent, covering agents without a permission profile and forbidding discovery/attachment to ambient sockets without explicit user direction.
…emote shell utilities (Gentleman-Programming#4324) The bare-command deny rules from the previous commit anchor on the literal start of the command string, so an agent could still reach remote infrastructure by resolving the same binaries differently: - Claude Code prefix rules never match /usr/bin/ssh, \ssh, or command ssh, because none of those strings start with 'ssh'. - OpenCode matches the full source text of each parsed shell command node (v1.18.10 permission/index.ts + util/wildcard.ts), so those forms are distinct patterns there too; its matcher also normalizes backslashes to forward slashes, which is what the /<tool> * entries cover. Both overlays now deny, per utility, one entry per canonical absolute install prefix (/bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, /opt/homebrew/bin, /run/current-system/sw/bin), the root-level absolute form, and the command and exec resolution wrappers, retaining the existing bare rules. The enumerated prefixes cover the OpenSSH client and rsync layouts of every supported platform; installs outside them still hit the always-on routing guidance 'Remote execution boundary' section.
… deny-by-default policy Rebase onto main brought in Gentleman-Programming#4327's fixtures, which pin ask-by-default and non-interception of absolute-path invocations. This PR ships the opposite policy for Gentleman-Programming#4324: deny by default (explicit personal config still wins and is not silently rewritten), and deny of absolute-path, backslash-escape, and shell resolution wrapper invocations of the remote shell utilities. Update both fixtures to pin the intended behavior instead of the upstream intermediate state.
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@Alan-TheGentleman @Gentleman-Programming the only failing check on this PR is Everything else is green on the current head (unit, E2E suites, Darwin, CodeRabbit). Two sibling PRs carry the same one-label blocker: #4198 and #4157. |
🔗 Linked Issue
Closes #4324 — slice 1 of 2. Slice 1 closes the reported attack path (
ssh -S /tmp/...plain invocation, denied in exact/wildcard/escaped/absolute-path forms). The wrapper evasions found during review (env /exec -a, wrapper-invoked absolute paths) land as follow-up hardening in slice 2.🏷️ PR Type
type:bug— Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)📝 Summary
ssh,scp,sftp,rsync) to both generated permission overlays, so an agent can no longer reach remote infrastructure through unrestricted bash./usr/bin/ssh *,\ssh *, …), closing the pattern-levelaskbypass at the executor. Plain wrappers (timeout ssh) are already stripped before matching in Claude Code;env/exec -awrappers and wrapper-invoked absolute paths are the follow-up slice./tmpor~/.ssh) without explicit user direction.📂 Changes
internal/components/permissions/inject.gossh/scp/sftp/rsync), deny entries for the exact form (Bash(ssh)), wildcard (Bash(ssh:*)), and absolute-path wildcards for/bin,/usr/bin,/usr/local/bin,/opt/homebrew/bin,/run/current-system/sw/bin(7 forms × 4 utilities). OpenCode/Kilocode overlay: matchingpermission.bashdeny entries (exact,*wildcard, escaped\/… *form, and the same five absolute-path prefixes).internal/components/agentguidance/routing.goRenderRouting, delivered to every configured agent (routing is the same always-on surface the kill switch uses).internal/components/permissions/inject_test.goTestInjectClaudeCodeDeniesRemoteShellUtilitiesandTestInjectOpenCodeDeniesRemoteShellUtilities(deny entries present after Inject, coexisting with"*": "allow"; Claude case exercises merge over a pre-existing permissions block), plus theTestRemoteMatcherBoundaryFixturesalignment with #4327's ask-by-default fixtures.internal/components/agentguidance/routing_test.goTestRenderRoutingMakesRemoteExecutionBoundaryDiscoverableasserting the boundary fragments for every supported agent.e2e/organicruntime/organic_runtime_test.goorganicRoutingGuidanceRequiredFragmentswith the two new routing fragments.🤖 AI Assistance
Tool/model: Pi coding agent (el Gentleman harness) — exploration, implementation and test writing delegated to subagents under single-session orchestration; reviewed and corrected by the human-driven parent session.
Material scope: Permission overlay entries, routing-guidance section, and all new tests (full diff is AI-authored under human direction).
Verification performed: Full unit suite, gofmt check, Docker E2E (3/3 platforms), and the repo's native 4-lens review lifecycle (risk/resilience/readability/reliability — approved, all findings advisory/informational).
🧪 Test Plan
Unit Tests
go test ./...Result: 72 packages
ok. One pre-existing environmental failure ininternal/components/mcp(TestInjectClaudeWorkspaceIsDiscoveredByNativeClaudeMCPList, requires nativeclaude mcp liststate) — verified failing identically onmain, unrelated to this change.Go Format
Result: pass.
E2E Tests (Docker required)
Result: 3/3 platforms (ubuntu, arch, fedora) PASSED — 79 passed / 0 failed per platform (Tier 1).
Benchmark Validation
N/A — permissions-overlay and guidance content change; not a review-lifecycle, gate, recovery, delivery, or benchmark change.
go test ./...)go run ./internal/gofmtcheck)cd e2e && ./docker-test.sh)Slice re-verification (post-split):
go build ./...,go test ./internal/components/permissions/... ./internal/components/agentguidance/..., andgo test ./e2e/organicruntime/...all pass at the slice head (a9b83076). The full-suite and Docker-E2E runs below were executed on the pre-split head (4a531512); CI re-runs them on this branch.New tests written first (RED confirmed: all 16 bash-map/deny assertions and routing fragments missing) and then implemented (GREEN), mirroring the existing test patterns in both packages.
Chain Context
mainexec -awrapper denies + wrapper-invoked absolute-path denies (branchfix/4324-wrapper-evasion-followupondanielgap/gentle-ai; opens after this merges — fork PRs cannot stack)main(rebased)ssh/scp/sftp/rsyncin both overlays + always-on remote-execution routing guidanceChain Overview
Scope
env/exec -awrapper denies, wrapper-invoked absolute-path denies (slice 2)Autonomy
✅ Contributor Checklist
status:approvedtype:*label to this PRgo test ./...)go run ./internal/gofmtcheck)cd e2e && ./docker-test.sh)Co-Authored-BytrailersSummary by CodeRabbit