This folder contains an independent concept-phase engineering package added in this fork
(jherrodthomas/openamr) by J. Herrod-Thomas. None of these documents are produced or endorsed by
the upstream maintainers (openAMRobot organisation — BHT University Berlin Mechatronics Lab /
Botshare); they are a fork-level safety analysis derived from the publicly published CAD,
schematics, BOM, ROS / firmware source and assembly documentation.
Important. This is a preliminary safety case for the integrated dual-arm AMR (mobile base + dual robotic arms + adjustable linear lift). Upstream publishes a repo structure with hardware and software sources, but does NOT publish a HARA, FMEA, ISO 13849-2 validation report, ISO 3691-4 brake / stopping-distance test data, ISO/TS 15066 power-and-force-limiting (PFL) measurements for the dual arms, or IEC 61496 LiDAR-scanner safety validation. Substantial subsystems — carrier PCB, hub-motor drivetrain, dual-arm integration, autodocking + wireless charging, ML-based CV — are on the published 6-month roadmap and not yet released. Provisional acceptance applies only to OE-1 (R&D / lab, supervised, bounded test area, no bystanders). Operation in intralogistics or any shared, human-occupied space is BLOCKED pending closure of the high-severity gaps tracked in the safety-case workbook.
| Standard | Coverage |
|---|---|
| ISO 12100:2010 | Master risk-assessment method |
| ISO 3691-4:2023 | Driverless industrial trucks — PRIMARY for the AMR base |
| ANSI/RIA R15.08-1:2020 | Industrial mobile robots — base + manipulator combination |
| ISO 10218-1/-2:2011 | Industrial robot safety — the dual arms |
| ISO/TS 15066:2016 | Collaborative robot — power-and-force-limiting (PFL) |
| ISO 13849-1:2023 / -2:2012 | Safety-related parts of control systems — PL & validation |
| IEC 61496-1/-3:2020 | Electro-sensitive protective equipment — LiDAR safety scanner |
| ISO 13855:2010 | Positioning of safeguards w.r.t. approach speed |
| IEC 60204-1:2018 | Electrical equipment of machines |
| ISO 9001:2015 | Quality management — design control, NCR, CAR |
| IEC 62133-2 / IEC 61980 (ref.) | Li-ion battery safety; wireless power transfer |
| EU 2023/1230 (ref.) | EU Machinery Regulation — conformity framework |
| ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148:2018 | Requirements engineering |
| ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2022 | Architecture description |
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
OpenAMR_Safety_Case.xlsx |
15-tab safety-case workbook — item def, hazard catalogue (41), HARA, FMEA, FSC (46 SFs), GSN argument, evidence + gap registers (29 gaps) |
OpenAMR_Safety_Case_Report.docx |
Narrative safety case |
OpenAMR_Safety_Case_Summary.pdf |
2-page executive summary |
OpenAMR_DFMEA.xlsx |
AIAG-VDA 2019 DFMEA — 12 tabs, 33 failure modes (20 H · 12 M · 1 L) |
OpenAMR_Requirements.xlsx |
SyRS + SRS + HwRS — 8 tabs, 117 requirements (58 safety, 6 cyber), bidirectional trace |
OpenAMR_Architecture.docx |
Five architectural views with embedded diagrams |
Diagrams/01_system_boundary.svg |
System boundary / context (ISO 12100 §5) |
Diagrams/02_functional_block.svg |
Functional block diagram (base + arms + lift + nav + power + compute) |
Diagrams/03_sf_allocation.svg |
Safety-function allocation map (6 domains × PL) |
Diagrams/04_comms_topology.svg |
Control & communication topology |
Diagrams/05_mode_fsm.svg |
Operating-mode FSM (OFF / IDLE / MANUAL / AUTO-NAV / MANIPULATE / DOCKED / ESTOP) |
OpenAMR_TestPlan.xlsx |
V-model test plan — 10 tabs, 153 cases (Unit 82 · Integration 30 · System 41), ISO 13849-2 + standards V&V matrices |
OpenAMR_Trace_Memo.docx |
Cross-package traceability verification memo |
OpenAMR_Engineering_Bundle.pdf |
Single-file stakeholder bundle (architecture + reqs + DFMEA + tests + gaps) |
PNG renders of each SVG diagram sit alongside in Diagrams/ for easy GitHub preview.
| Item | Count |
|---|---|
| Hazards catalogued | 41 |
| Safety functions (FSC) | 46 |
| Standards-clauses examined | 28 |
| Open gaps | 29 (9 Very-High · 12 High · 8 Med) |
| Requirements (SyRS + SRS + HwRS) | 117 |
| DFMEA failure modes | 33 (20 High-AP) |
| Test cases | 153 |
5 minutes — OpenAMR_Safety_Case_Summary.pdf.
30 minutes — OpenAMR_Engineering_Bundle.pdf.
If you're an integrator deciding whether to deploy:
OpenAMR_Safety_Case_Report.docx(executive summary + recommended next-revision actions)OpenAMR_Safety_Case.xlsxtabs12_Gapsand15_DashboardOpenAMR_DFMEA.xlsxAction Plan Tracker tabOpenAMR_TestPlan.xlsxISO 13849-2 Validation Matrix tab and the standards V&V matrix tab
| Operating envelope | Acceptance | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| OE-1 R&D / lab (supervised, bounded test area) | Provisional YES | Trained researcher, no bystanders, low hazard profile |
| OE-2 Light intralogistics | Not yet — 14 gaps to close | Speed/brake data, validated scanner, zoning needed |
| OE-3 Mixed-traffic intralogistics | Not yet — 21 gaps to close | Combined-system RA, PFL, Cat 3, ISO 13849-2 validation |
| OE-4 Public-facing / last-mile | Not at any near-term rev | 25 gaps + regulatory engagement (EU 2023/1230, CE, local) |
| FM | Description | AP | Linked gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| FM-09 | Personnel-detection safeguard not present / not validated | H | GAP-61496-01 |
| FM-23 | E-Stop fails to remove motion power | H | GAP-60204-01 |
| FM-20 | Li-ion cell thermal runaway | H | GAP-T01 |
| FM-02 | Loss of braking / insufficient deceleration | H | GAP-3691-02 |
| FM-01 | Hub-motor runaway | H | GAP-13849-01 |
| FM-06 | LiDAR blind to low / overhanging obstacles | H | GAP-61496-01 |
| FM-12 | Arm strike during concurrent base motion | H | GAP-R1508-01 |
| FM-10 | Protective-field response time exceeds stopping distance | H | GAP-13855-01 |
| FM-31 | Tip-over with arm extended and lift raised while moving | H | GAP-R1508-02 |
Upstream is MIT (permissive). The documents in this folder are derivative analytical works of
the upstream specifications; they are released under the same MIT licence, with attribution to the
upstream openAMRobot project retained.
J. Herrod-Thomas — fork maintainer / independent assessor. Issues, comments, or corrections welcome via the GitHub Issues tab on this fork.