talon/examples/product-demo/talon.config.yaml at main · dativo-io/talon · GitHub

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# Talon product demo — the organization baseline for a company's AI use cases.
#
# One file, owned by the platform team: the company-wide defaults every use case
# inherits, the providers Talon may call, and the agents_dir where each use case
# lives as its own agent.talon.yaml. One `talon serve` reads all of it and
# operates the whole fleet — customer-support, coding-assistant, document-summary
# — from a single process.
#
# REAL providers, real spend (~$0.02-0.05/run on cheap models). No mock. Needs
# OPENAI_API_KEY and ANTHROPIC_API_KEY. examples/product-demo/demo.sh binds the
# gateway to loopback only, mints random admin + traffic keys, and requires the
# local model (Ollama, :11434) to be OFFLINE so a real connection failure
# triggers a real, policy-valid failover.

gateway:
  enabled: true
  listen_prefix: "/v1/proxy"
  mode: "enforce"

  providers:
    # customer-support's PREFERRED provider: a local model (in-region, cheap).
    # It is OFFLINE during the demo (demo.sh asserts :11434 is not answering), so
    # a request to it fails with a real connection error and Talon fails over.
    # It carries a DUMMY secret — never a cloud credential — so a cloud key can
    # never be transmitted to a local or user-supplied endpoint.
    local-llama:
      enabled: true
      secret_name: "local-llama-demo-key"
      base_url: "http://localhost:11434"   # Ollama (OpenAI-compatible) — offline in this demo
      region: "LOCAL"
      api_family: "openai"
      allowed_models: ["llama3.2:1b"]
      # A fallback must stay policy-valid. The chain is walked in order; each
      # candidate is re-checked against the agent's effective policy BEFORE it is
      # dispatched, and the request's model is rewritten to one the candidate can
      # serve. openai-batch could serve the rewritten model but is NOT on
      # customer-support's allowed_providers, so it is skipped for THAT reason;
      # openai is the first policy-valid fallback.
      fallback:
        - { provider: openai-batch, model: "gpt-4o-mini" }
        - { provider: openai, model: "gpt-4o-mini" }

    # A second configured OpenAI destination profile the company uses for OTHER
    # use cases. Same wire format; it is deliberately NOT on customer-support's
    # allowed_providers, so the failover walk skips it — availability never
    # overrides the use-case policy.
    openai-batch:
      enabled: true
      secret_name: "openai-api-key"
      base_url: "https://api.openai.com"
      region: "US"
      api_family: "openai"
      allowed_models: ["gpt-4o-mini"]

    # The real, healthy OpenAI provider: customer-support's fallback + the
    # coding-assistant tool beat.
    openai:
      enabled: true
      secret_name: "openai-api-key"
      base_url: "https://api.openai.com"
      region: "US"
      allowed_models: ["gpt-4o", "gpt-4o-mini"]

    # The real Anthropic provider: document-summary runs here. One control plane,
    # more than one provider.
    anthropic:
      enabled: true
      secret_name: "anthropic-api-key"
      base_url: "https://api.anthropic.com"
      region: "US"
      allowed_models: ["claude-sonnet-5", "claude-haiku-4-5"]

  # Company defaults + hard boundaries every use case inherits. An agent can only
  # TIGHTEN these, never weaken them.
  organization_policy:
    defaults:
      pii_action: "redact"          # scan for PII and mask it before the provider
      tool_policy_action: "block"   # reject a request that carries a forbidden tool
    constraints:
      # The organization tool boundary. No use case may ever be handed a
      # destructive admin_* tool — an agent that declares tool_policy_action:
      # filter still cannot weaken this to a silent strip.
      forbidden_tools: ["admin_*"]
    log_prompts: false
    log_responses: false

  rate_limits:
    global_requests_per_min: 600
    per_agent_requests_per_min: 120

  timeouts:
    connect_timeout: 5s
    request_timeout: 60s
    stream_idle_timeout: 60s

# One directory, one agent.talon.yaml per use case. Discovered and served
# together (Fleet Operations v1).
agents_dir: agents

# Re-scan the agent files this often so a policy edit (the demo lowers a daily
# budget to stage the fleet's blocked state) activates promptly.
agents_reload_interval: "2s"

# Evidence signing key. Prefer the TALON_SIGNING_KEY env var (the demo sets a
# random one); this file value keeps a manual run self-contained.
signing_key: "product-demo-signing-key-not-for-production"